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I. INTRODUCTION
Retirement and retrospection are inextricably linked, and the retirement
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist will be no exception. The occasion
doubtlessly will evoke an explosion of analysis reviewing the contributions of
the "Rehnquist Court" to American jurisprudence.' Rehnquist's work as a jurist
will provide the predominant focus for most accounts of his legacy, and justifia-
bly so. Few would dispute that the Court's decisions during Rehnquist's tenure
as Chief Justice presented a dramatic break from the understanding of the Con-
stitution that prevailed during the Burger era. However, no history on this sub-
ject could be complete without also assaying Rehnquist's performance in those
obligations particular to the office of the Chief Justice. This Article seeks to
provide a point of departure for that discussion.
This Article addresses whether Rehnquist adequately discharged his
constitutional responsibility to preside over the impeachment trial of William
Jefferson Clinton. Legal scholars have devoted considerable attention to the
legal questions surrounding President Clinton's trial, but few have cast a critical
eye toward Rehnquist's actions as presiding judge.2 Even those scholars who
have commented upon Rehnquist's performance tend to credit the Chief Justice
for amicably having completed a formal or symbolic task.3 Indeed, the prevail-
Indeed, the retrospection has already begun in earnest. See generally MARTIN H. BELSKY,
ed., THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE (forthcoming Spring 2002); THOMAS R.
HENSLEY, THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY (forthcoming Spring
2002).
One hopes that these prospective "retrospectives" are aware of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and other noteworthy opinions issued during the
2000-01 term. Compare TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 244 (2000) (observing that members of the Rehnquist Court are "reluctant... to
use equal protection as a vessel for rights not mentioned elsewhere in the Constitution") with
STEPHEN E. GOTrLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA
38 (2000) ("Conservative disdain for democracy shows quite starkly in the voting and district-
ing cases where the Court's conservatives have backed away from the Warren Court's insis-
tence on the right to vote, and on equality among voters.").
2 The inattention was by no means universal. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, Report Card on
Impeachment: Judging the Institutions that Judged President Clinton, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143, 159 (2000) (awarding the Chief Justice "an A+" for performing his duties "well
and with humor"); John D. Feerick, Remarks on the Fordham-Stein Prize Presentation to Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1059, 1059 (2000) (bestowing honors upon
Rehnquist for, inter alia, his performance during the Clinton trial, where through "wise and
mature leadership, he provided a much needed balance to the politics of the moment, and
helped restore public confidence to our government institutions at a very turbulent time"); Mi-
chael J. Gerhardt, The Perils of Presidential Impeachment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 293, 298-99
(2000) (offering that "no senator ever challenged nor did the Senate overturn a single ruling
made by Chief Justice Rehnquist during the trial" as evidence of "the extraordinary respect that
the Senate gave to the Chief Justice"); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE
INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 168 (1999) (commenting
disapprovingly upon Rehnquist's attire).
3 See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 2, at 159 (observing Rehnquist's role to have been "fairly
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ing wisdom in the legal academy holds that the Chief Justice's proper role in
impeachment trials is or should be extremely limited.4
This Article provides a different view. The Constitution provides only
scarce guidance as to how the Senate should conduct impeachment trials, and
instruction on the Chief Justice's role in that process is scarcer still. Neverthe-
less, the text and structure of the Constitution, historical practice, and recent
lessons derived from judicial precedent suggest that the Chief Justice's part in
the impeachment process is a significant - if rarely exercised - component in
the balance of power within the federal government. In other words, the Chief
Justice's role is one with independent, constitutional import, and it should be
recognized as such. This more robust ideal is the standard against which
Rehnquist's performance should be measured.
Part H of this Article provides a background on the impeachment proc-
ess. This section presumes that many of the more interesting legal questions
involved in impeachment are known to the reader. In fact, the section's focus on
procedure is intended to avoid precipitating a relapse into the fatigue that envel-
oped most discussions about the impeachment process during the last two years.
Part III of the Article recounts in detail the conventional understandings of the
Chief Justice's role in the impeachment process. This section seeks to identify
and address the shortcomings of the minimalist conceptions of the duty to pre-
side. Part IV offers an alternative perspective through which to gauge the Chief
Justice's participation in the impeachment process. Specifically, the section
suggests that the Chief Justice should exert a strong presence over impeachment
trials, with the aim of encouraging reasoned deliberation among individual sena-
tors. The section also reviews the conduct of William H. Rehnquist during the
impeachment trials of President Clinton, assessing his conduct against the stan-
dard introduced therein. Part V addresses the implications of Rehnquist's per-
formance for future impeachment trials.
II. FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT: PURPOSES AND PROCEDURES
Impeachment is the process by which the Congress may remove from
office the President, federal judges, or other civil officers of the United States.
The overwhelming majority of impeachments since 1789 have sought to remove
federal judges,5 and the only impeachment trials that have resulted in conviction
limited [to] that of [a] traffic cop").
4 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 130 ("If the limitation of the Chief Justice's authority in
impeachment trials isn't clear as a matter of law (I think it is clear), it is clear as a matter of
political theory.") (internal footnote omitted).
5 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1 (1973) ("Im-
peachment, [is] with us largely a means for the ouster of corrupt judges[.]") (citing JOSEPH
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (1962)). In fact, of the sixteen federal impeachments since 1789,
nearly ninety percent (13/16ths) concerned members of the judiciary. See MARY L.
VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 89 (1996).
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involve judges as defendants. 6 However, the more intractable problems related
to impeachment arise when the Congress attempts to remove the President from
office. It is in that rare context - where the legislative branch challenges directly
the executive - that impeachment truly warrants the dire descriptions with
which many commentators describe the process.7 More importantly, only presi-
dential impeachments require the Chief Justice to preside over a Senate trial.8
This following discussion seeks to place that duty in the broader context of con-
stitutional language, historical practice, and judicial construction.
A. The Impeachment Clauses
The Constitution contains six provisions relating to impeachment. 9 The
instruction contained therein is, at the same time, maddeningly vague and ex-
traordinarily detailed. Allocation of responsibility among the branches of gov-
ernment and the houses of Congress is clear. The House of Representatives pos-
sesses exclusive authority to impeach - that is, "[t]o accuse; to charge a liability
on"'10 - public officials." As a practical matter, the House may impeach an offi-
cial through a simple majority vote, but this is not a constitutional command. 12
The Senate has exclusive authority to conduct trials of those public officials so
accused, and to acquit or convict those officials. 13 Decisions to convict a federal
6 See Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1233,
1249 & n.93 (2000) (summarizing convictions).
7 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Kind of Coup, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 14, 1999, at 61
(vividly describing impeachment as "a seismic shock to the separation of powers").
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside.").
9 See JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1 (1978); see also MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 4 n. 13 (2d ed. 2000) (identifying five of the
six impeachment clauses, without recognizing the prohibition upon pardons for impeachment
contained in Article II, section 2, clause 1). The impeachment clauses are described in greater
detail infra at notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (6th ed. 1990); see also GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 26
("In the words of traditional English parliamentary practice ... the managers orally 'impeach' -
or accuse - the impeached official (or respondent) in the Senate.").
I See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.").
12 See id. The Constitution does not provide a requisite threshold for the approval of articles
of impeachment, and it grants the House discretion to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings".
Id., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. In practice, it would be nearly impossible for the House to fashion an im-
peachment procedure that requires less than a majority of its members. A majority could readily
undo that process through a parliamentary point of order. See generally 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1548 (David C. Bacon et al., eds. 1995) (describing require-
ments for interposing a point of order to halt substantive decisions).
13 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Im-
peachments.").
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official require the vote of two-thirds of the senators present, 14 and the senators
who participate must "be on Oath or Affirmation."' 5
The effect of impeachment upon a public official is nearly as clear as
the allocation of responsibility among branches. Impeachment removes the pub-
lic official from his or her post and disqualifies the official from thereafter hold-
ing a position of public trust.16 Impeachment is beyond the scope of those of-
fenses for which the President may grant pardons," and a convicted official
remains liable in criminal or civil courts.18 Before the House of Representatives
approved articles of impeachment against President Clinton, some questions
lingered about whether the substitution of censure - a resolution by one or both
houses expressing disapproval of the President's conduct - for impeachment
could comport with the Constitution.19 The overwhelming weight of authority
indicates that at least some forms of censure are acceptable alternatives to im-
peachment.20
Aside from these "easy questions," two ambiguous clauses pertaining to
impeachment have generated important and persistent problems of interpreta-
tion. First, the designation within the Constitution that impeachment remedy
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors ' 21 has sparked a
debate about what conduct subjects an official to impeachment, who decides
whether particular conduct is an impeachable offense, and whether an official
has any recourse if impeached for an offense that does not meet the constitu-
14 See id. ("And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.").
15 Id.
16 See id., art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States.").
17 See id., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("[H]e shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
18 See id., art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("[T]he Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.").
19 See House Floor Debate on Four Articles of Impeachment against President Clinton,
Second Segment, Dec. 18, 1998 (Remarks of Rep. Ray LaHood (R-Ill.)), available at 1998 WL
883527 ("We discussed this in the committee, and there were numerous constitutional experts
that addressed that. Stephen Presser, Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History at Northwestern
University School of Law, wrote a letter to Congressman Delahunt disagreeing about censure,
and saying that censure would not be constitutional. He said, 'In my opinion, impeachment is
the remedy for misconduct.'").
20 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 33, 34
(1999) (asserting that "every conceivable source of constitutional authority - text, structure,
original understanding, and historical practices - supports the legitimacy of the House's and/or
the Senate's passage of a resolution expressing disapproval of the President's conduct.").
21 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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tional threshold.22 The impeachment of President Clinton appears to have
heightened, rather than resolved, the disagreement on those matters.23 Second,
and more importantly for the subject of this Article, the delegation to the Senate
of the power to "try all Impeachments" 24 sparked litigation about what proce-
dures the Constitution requires of a Senate impeachment trial.25 The Supreme
Court deemed this question to be a nonjusticiable political question,26 but the
Court rooted its decision on grounds, discussed below, that did not foreclose
entirely future challenges to the procedure employed in Senate trials.27
Finally, the requirement that the Chief Justice preside over the im-
peachment trial of the President is one of the ambiguous Impeachment
Clauses.28 During the Clinton impeachment proceedings, the Congress, the
Chief Justice, and commentators considered the definition of "preside" to be an
easy question, as plain as the quantum of votes required to convict the President,
or the requirement that the House impeach and the Senate conduct a trial. That
the word "preside" is at least as ambiguous as the word "try," and that the Su-
preme Court had recently considered the latter to be so unclear as to avoid judi-
22 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of
Impeachments after Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231 (1994); Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer for the
Constitutionally Impaired, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 743, 749 (1994); Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and
Other Not So "Good Behavior": Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to the Impeachment of
Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1617 (1994); Matthew N. Kaplan, Who Will Guard the
Guardians? Independent Counsel, State Secrets, and Judicial Review, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1787
(1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
23 The academic discussion of this topic is almost too voluminous to cite with any effect, but
the testimony before the House Judiciary Committee of several prominent law professors dur-
ing the Clinton impeachment proceedings provides an illustrative cross-section. See, e.g., Tes-
timony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Impeachment, U.S. House of
Representatives, Nov. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WL 783744 (testimony of Professor Susan
Low Bloch); Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Impeach-
ment, U.S. House of Representatives, Nov. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WL 781678 (testimony
of Professor Robert F. Drinan); Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommit-
tee on Impeachment, U.S. House of Representatives, Nov. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WL
783736 (testimony of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt); Testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Impeachment, U.S. House of Representatives, Nov. 9, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 783740 (testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley); Presentation of the
White House to the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 8, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 850444 (testimony of Professor Bruce Ackerman) [hereinafter Presenta-
tion of the White House to the Committee on the Judiciary].
24 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
25 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
26 See id. at 238 ("[W]e conclude, after exercising that delicate responsibility, that the word
'try' in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the au-
thority which is committed to the Senate.").
27 See infra Part I.C.
28 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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cial definition, 9 appeared insignificant compared to the pressing legal questions
that directly touched upon whether the President would be ousted from office.
With that said, in contrast to the requisite elements of an impeachment trial, the
history of Article I, section 3 provides some guidance on the contemplated
scope of the Chief Justice's role.
B. Historical Insights on the Role of the Chief Justice
That the Constitution establishes procedures particular to presidential
impeachment trials is no accident. The Framers drafted the Impeachment
Clauses with the removal of the President primarily in mind.30 The deliberations
of the Framers and of the delegates to ratifying conventions provide insights into
why the Framers thought the Senate to be the proper forum for the trial of im-
peachments, and why the Chief Justice has any part in the trial of the President.
The lessons that one can derive from history on these matters falls into two
broad categories: the Framers' concern for balance between the legislative and
executive branches and the competing virtues of law and politics as animating
principles for adjudicating impeachment.
These problems of institutional balance permeate the Framers' discus-
sion of impeachment procedures. Historical literature recounts the debates at the
Convention about whether to establish a strong executive or a strong legislature
in excruciating detail, and the allocation of power within the national govern-
ment colored every decision on impeachment. Even for those scholars who do
not believe the original intent of the Framers to be the conclusive goal of consti-
tutional interpretation, the proposals for impeachment procedures offered at the
Convention are significant for their persuasive authority. 31 In other words, be-
yond being legislative history, the derivation of the impeachment proposals pro-
vides an extraordinary survey in political theory. As such, the Framers' ideas
about the allocation of responsibility among the coordinate branches is relevant
in both the positive and the normative sense to determining the Chief Justice's
appropriate role.
The initial draft for a national government presented to the Conven-
tion's Committee of the Whole accorded to the proposed national judiciary the
authority to adjudicate "impeachments of any National officers. 32 At the time
the Committee debated that plan, originally proposed by Edmund Randolph,33
29 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230
30 LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 2; see also BERGER, supra note 5, at 97.
31 See GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 4 ("lilt is worth examining in some detail the constitu-
tional convention debates on impeachment because they not only are inherently interesting but
also reflect the understanding of reasonable readers of the document at or around the time of its
drafting and ratification.").
32 LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 2 (quoting Virginia Plan at art. 9).
33 Id.; see also GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 5.
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its members had not yet determined whether national executive authority would
reside within a single person.3a The delegates perceived it necessary to create a
procedure for removing federal officials - "to place the power of removing
somewhere," in the words of John Dickinson of Delaware35 - but they disagreed
about the desirability of placing such power within the hands of judges.
Dickinson proposed that the executive be removed upon petition of a
majority of state legislatures after trial by the national legislature.36 By rough
analogy to our constitutional system, the Senate, as it existed before the enact-
ment of the Seventeenth Amendment, 37 could remove the President by majority
vote. During debate, James Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of Pennsyl-
vania objected that the proposal would "enable a minority of the people to pre-
vent [the] removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the
eyes of a majority," and this criticism doomed the Dickinson resolution.38 Seen
as excessively counter-majoritarian, the resolution garnered the support of only
Delaware upon a vote, with the rest of the Committee of the Whole pronouncing
an overwhelming rejection.39 Ultimately, the Committee, propelled by the sup-
port of Madison and Randolph, discharged Article Nine of the Virginia Plan,
which granted jurisdiction over impeachments to the judiciary.40
Article Nine did not last long. On July 17, 1787, the Convention struck
the clause giving the judiciary jurisdiction over impeachments. 41 At the time of
that decision, the delegates had not yet determined the method by which judges
would be appointed, nor whether the executive would be eligible to serve more
than one fixed term of office.4 2 The decision to strike Article Nine granted the
delegates a tabula rasa upon which to decide whether the executive would be
subject to impeachment and what entity or entities would assert and resolve im-
peachments.
The Convention affirmed that federal officials would be subject to im-
peachment, and the delegates then addressed the allocation of impeachment
authority. Two proposals framed the deliberations, from the initial report of the
34 See LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 2.
35 Id. at 3.
36 See id.
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
38 LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 3. The counter-majoritarian concerns resulted from the ability
of states with small populations, such as (Dickinson's) Delaware, to seek or to oppose removal
with strength equal to that of larger states, such as (Madison's) Virginia and (Wilson's) Penn-
sylvania.
39 See id.
40 See LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 5; see also GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 5.
41 LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 5.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 6.
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Committee on the Whole, through the debates on the Committee on Detail" and
the Committee of Eleven,45 to the Convention's final decision to rest the author-
ity to conduct impeachment trials within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate.
Several delegates believed that the judiciary should possess all power
over impeachments. Madison and Randolph, the strongest proponents of the
Virginia Plan in the Committee of the Whole, advocated granting to the Su-
preme Court authority over the initiation and trial of impeachments.46 Alexander
Hamilton proposed a variation based on the New York Constitution, under
which all impeachments would be "tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or
Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each state.' 47 William Paterson of New
Jersey suggested that the national legislature hold the power to initiate im-
peachments. 48 The Committee on Detail approved a modified version of Pater-
son's "New Jersey Plan" in the draft resolution that it released on August 6,
1787, granting the House of Representatives the "sole power of impeachment,"
but recommending that "impeachments shall be ... before the Senate and the
judges of the [federal] judicial Court." 49
The initial proposal to give the judiciary authority to try impeachments
is significant in several respects. First, the proposal reflected that the Framers
considered impeachment to be primarily a legal or judicial endeavor. 50 As dem-
onstrated by the rejection of Dickinson's proposal in the Committee of the
Whole and subsequent proposals for a parliamentary-type system, the Framers
considered impeachment to be an undertaking governed by principle, rather than
raw politics. Even Hamilton, eventually a fierce proponent of legislative control
of impeachment trials, would later warn of the connection between impeach-
ment and "preexisting factions.'5 Hamilton did not dispute that principles
should motivate impeachment, but asserted that the super-majoritarian provi-
44 The Committee on Detail possessed responsibility for producing a draft constitution
composed of the various proposals that prevailed on the floor. LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 11.
45 The Committee on Eleven possessed responsibility for reporting those parts of the
Constitution which had not yet been acted upon. GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 6.
46 See id. at 5-6.
47 Id. at 5-6.
48 See id. at 5.
49 Id., at 6; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its
Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1, 11 n.36 (1989) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits to
Impeachment and Its Alternatives].
50 See Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOSTRA L. REV. 291, 307 (1999)
("Sometimes, the rule of law does require a Senator to damn the polls. If in her heart a Senator
thinks the President is innocent in fact (he actually did not do it) or in law (even if he did it, it is
not a 'high crime or misdemeanor'), then she must vote not guilty - even if she thereby offends
her constituents, who want that man's head.").
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 424-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961);
see also BERGER, supra note 5, at 100 (describing the contrary views of James Madison).
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sions contained in the Constitution could be sufficient to alleviate the effects of
partisanship on the impeachment process.52
Second, the strongest opposition to vesting the legislature with the
power to remove the executive arose from fears that doing so would erode the
executive's authority. Madison observed that such an arrangement would make
the President "improperly dependent" on the Senate for any conduct that could
be characterized as an impeachable offense.53 Charles Pinckney of South Caro-
lina warned that granting the legislature the authority to remove the executive
would vitiate the executive's veto power.54 Rufus King of Massachusetts con-
cuffed that "under no circumstances ought [the executive] to be impeachable by
the Legislature" because such an arrangement would be "destructive of [the
executive's] independence and of the principles of the Constitution. 5 The two
concerns voiced in this debate - against partisan impeachment and against
dooming the executive to legislative sufferance - were recurring themes during
President Clinton's impeachment trial.
The second proposal, by Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, an early
proponent of choosing the executive through popular election,56 sought to place
the power to try impeachments exclusively within the national legislature. Mor-
ris moved to postpone consideration on the inclusion of impeachment trials
within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.57 The success of Morris's motion had
the effect of giving the Committee of Eleven license to draft impeachment trial
procedure.58 The committee decided, first, that a college of national electors,
rather than the Senate, would elect the President, and, second, that the Senate
would possess "power to try all impeachments. 59 It was this draft that eventu-
ally prevailed at the Convention, with only Pennsylvania and Virginia dissenting
from the decision to make the Senate the sole forum for impeachment trials. 6°
There are important lessons to be derived from this shift as well. The
decision to vest the Senate with the power over impeachment trials was not the
product of reasoned deliberation by the Convention as a whole, but resulted
from a parliamentary maneuver that delegated decision-making control to a
committee favorable to Morris's opinion. The Convention did approve the pro-
posals, and there is no question that the result was legitimate, but the delegates
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 51, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton).
53 GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 7; see also LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 15.
54 See LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 8-9; see also BERGER, supra note 5, at 96, 100.
55 LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 9.
56 Id. at 4.
57 GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 6.
58 See supra note 44.
59 GERHARDT, supra note 9, at 6-7.
60 Id. at7.
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did not review the respective virtues of trial by court or by legislature during the
debates. 6' The Committee of Eleven's report was a paradigmatic legislative log-
roll, bundling several momentous decisions into one recommendation.62
The objections to vesting trial authority in the judiciary differed qualita-
tively from the objections against granting power to the legislature. Morris was
concerned that granting the Supreme Court command of impeachment trials
would create conflicts of interest for the Court and the executive.63 The Commit-
tee on Detail proposed that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court be appointed
to the President's privy council, an idea upon which the Convention never voted
to approve or to reject. 64 Morris noted that it would be anomalous for the Presi-
dent's fate to hinge on the judgment of his counselor.65 Roger Sherman dis-
agreed with delegating to the Supreme Court authority over presidential im-
peachment trials because "the Judges would be appointed by [the president]. ''66
Morris and Hamilton pointed to the additional problem of granting the Supreme
Court jurisdiction over impeachment trials because the Court might subse-
quently rule on criminal or civil trials of the same official.67 These objections
may be properly characterized as those based on potential for the appearance of
conflict, rather than systemic problems with the balance of powers among the
branches.
Many delegates did voice structural concerns about holding impeach-
ment trials in the judiciary. Hamilton's defense of granting exclusive power to
the legislature over impeachment contained in The Federalist No. 65, for exam-
ple, is the justification for legislative trial that prevails in popular thought to-
day.68 The essay appealed to English and colonial precedent, 69 but also force-
fully cast impeachment as a check by popular representatives upon overreaching
61 See LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 19.
62 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1469
n.248 (1989) ("'Logrolling' refers to the practice of trading a vote on one issue in exchange for
another's vote on another issue. The term derives from the construction of log cabins in new
settlements: 'I'll roll your log if you'll roll mine.' The practice of attaching substantive riders to
appropriations bills furnishes a familiar example. A faction unable to pass its agenda in the
normal course may succeed by holding the rest of a carefully wrought budget hostage to its
goals.") See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
63 See LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 12.
64 Id. at 12 n.24.
65 See id. at 12.
66 Id. at 16.
67 See Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, supra note 49,
at 12 n.41.
68 See supra note 51; see also LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 19.
69 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 5 1, at 427.
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by the executive branch.7° Similarly, Madison's Convention notes describe the
concern that delegating control of impeachment trials to the judiciary would
taint the courts. 71 However, these structural reasons for not delegating im-
peachment trials to the Supreme Court address different concerns than those
reflected in Madison's notes. The objections do not contend that principle
should not guide impeachment, but they identify reasons why the Senate would
provide a more legitimate or more responsive tribunal for applying those princi-
ples. Like Madison, Hamilton recognized passions and partisanship within the
Senate to be a persistent problem, but Hamilton disagreed with Madison about
the extent to which factionalism posed a real threat to the republic.72
The Committee of Eleven introduced the idea that the Chief Justice
would preside over Senate impeachment trials. 7 3 The provision was not the sub-
ject of debate at the Convention, and the directive appeared in the wake of the
more significant decision to strip the judiciary of all authority to conduct im-
peachment trials.
74
C. The Lessons of Later Judicial Precedent
The United States Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the history of
the Impeachment Clauses in Nixon v. United States,75 in which the Court re-
jected as a nonjusticiable political question a challenge by an impeached federal
judge to impeachment procedures that did not include a full-evidentiary hearing
in the Senate.76 In so doing, the Court declined to decide whether the former
judge had been tried by the Senate in a procedural manner that comported with
the Senate's constitutional duty. Commentators have declared that the decision
effectively foreclosed all judicial review of impeachment trials. 77
70 LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 19; see also Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits to Impeachment
and Its Alternatives, supra note 49, at 124.
71 See Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 117,
123 n.42 (1998).
72 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
73 See LABOVITZ, supra note 9, at 13.
74 See Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, supra note 49,
at 26-27 ("No doubt, the framers may have envisioned a trial-like proceeding as the means by
which the Senate would effect impeachments and removals, but this fact hardly justifies the
inference of an appeal to a court of law, particularly because the Constitution explicitly directs
the Chief Justice to preside over presidential impeachments and because the framers specifi-
cally rejected having judges serve as the impeachment or removal tribunal.").
75 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
76 See id. at 238 ("[W]e conclude, after exercising that delicate responsibility, that the word
'try' in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the au-
thority which is committed to the Senate.").
77 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeach-
ments After Nixon, 44 DuKE L. J. 231, 233 (1994) ("Nixon recognized that in the area of im-
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Judge Nixon challenged the validity of Senate Impeachment Rule XI,
which permits a select committee of Senators to receive and consider evidence
of impeachable offenses, obviating the need for the entire Senate to devote its
attention to an impeachment trial.7 In finding that the Supreme Court could not
review Nixon's allegation that Rule XI violated the Senate's constitutional obli-
gation to "try" impeachments,79 Chief Justice Rehnquist made two observations
of great significance to the scope of the Chief Justice's responsibility to "pre-
side" that appears in the Impeachment Trial Clause.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the word "'try' in the first
sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford
any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate's actions., 80 The
Chief Justice examined the plain text of the Constitution and dictionary defini-
tions of the word "try" dating to the inception of the Republic.81 In language that
could apply with equal force to the meaning of the word "preside" that appears
in the same clause of the Constitution, the Chief Justice concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to rule that the use of the word "try" in the Impeach-
ment Trial Clause provided any implied limitations on the Senate's conduct of
impeachment trials. 82 The term was too imprecise to provide courts guidance as
to how the Senate should conduct its proceedings, and the Supreme Court found
this to support the conclusion that the Court could not review the constitutional
validity of Rule XI.
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the existence of other,
more specific, procedural safeguards in the Impeachment Trial Clause cast
doubt upon the implied existence of judicially enforceable trial prerequisites
aside from those delineated in the Constitution itself. Referring to the require-
ments that Senators be under Oath when considering impeachment, 83 that the
peachment, Congress may make constitutional law - i.e. make judgments about the scope and
meaning of its constitutionally authorized impeachment functions - subject to change only if it
later changes its mind or by a constitutional amendment. Thus, Nixon raised the issue of
whether, without judicial review, Congress is able to make constitutional decisions in a rea-
sonably principled fashion.") [hereinafter Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability].
78 See Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Impeachment Rule XI, S.
Doc. No. 1, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 186 (1989) ("[T]he presiding officer of the Senate, if the
Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony
at such times and places as the committee may determine, and for such purpose the committee
so appointed and the chairman thereof... shall ... exercise all the powers and functions con-
ferred upon the Senate ... when sitting on impeachment trials.").
79 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
80 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230 (1993).
81 See id.
82 See id. ("Based on the variety of definitions, however, we cannot say that the Framers
used the word 'try' as an implied limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed
in trying impeachments.").
83 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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Senate not convict without a super-majority of support,an and that the Chief Jus-
tice preside over presidential impeachment trials, 5 the Chief Justice observed
that the "limitations are quite precise, and their nature suggests that the Framers
did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate pro-
ceedings by the use of the word 'try' in the first sentence., 86 In other words, the
explicit safeguards refuted the possibility of implicit procedural requirements.
The lessons of Nixon for the question of the Chief Justice's role in
presidential impeachment trials are straightforward. The conduct that constitutes
"to preside" is ambiguous and, under the rationale of Nixon, probably would
elude meaningful judicial review. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified
the Chief Justice's role in presidential impeachments to be an "explicit constitu-
tional constraint. . . on the impeachment power., 87 To the extent that this con-
ception of the duty to preside is accurate, the Chief Justice's part in impeach-
ment proceedings cannot be a complete nullity.
I1. CONVENTIONAL IDEAS ABOUT THE DUTY TO PRESIDE AND THEIR
SHORTCOMINGS
This section of the Article reviews the conventional conceptions of the
duty to preside that prevail in the legal academy today. This section posits that,
amidst the weightier issues that enveloped the potential removal of a President,
the legal academy directed scant attention toward the performance of the Chief
Justice, and that critical review of the Chief Justice's conduct to date has lacked
an overarching normative framework through which to assay the Chief Justice's
role.
A. The Minimalist Notion of the Chief Justice As Symbolic Official
The conception of the duty to preside that goes furthest in denying the
Chief Justice any structural part in the impeachment of the President is that
which grants the position a completely symbolic role. Under this perspective,
the justification for the Chief Justice's participation in the impeachment process
is symbolic.88 In the words of Professor Akhil Reed Amar, the reason for the
Chief Justice's occupation of the Vice President's chair in the Senate chamber is
"to mark these [presidential] impeachments as hugely distinct from all others,
calling for special solemnity. 89 Presidential impeachments, as Professor Amar
84 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
85 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside.").
86 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230.
87 Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability, supra note 77, at 248-49.
88 See Amar, supra note 50, at 311.
89 Id. at 311-12.
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observes, have the potential to "transform . . . an entire branch of govern-
ment." 90 The sight of the Chief Justice of the United States, the nation's most
powerful jurist, sitting (or standing 91) on the dais is supposed to instill the im-
peachment trial with a sense of gravity. As with any courtroom, the specter of a
judge sitting on high is to warn the Senators, impeachment managers from the
House, defense attorneys, witnesses, and assembled onlookers that something of
great importance transpires.
Support may be found elsewhere in the Constitution for the proposition
that the Chief Justice's participation has a symbolic significance in the im-
peachment process. The Constitution requires that Senators "be on Oath or Af-
firmation" during impeachment trials.9 Pursuant to this requirement, Rule
XXIV of the Senate's rules on impeachment procedure establish the form of the
oath to be administered to the members of the Senate sitting in the trial of im-
peachments:
I solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that in all
things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of [the im-
peached official], now pending, I will do impartial justice ac-
cording to the Constitution and its laws: So help me God.9 3
The Chief Justice recognized this constitutional requirement to be an-
other explicit constraint on the Senate's impeachment authority in Nixon.
94
When one considers that the Senators have already sworn, by virtue of their
position as public officials of the United States, an oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion and its laws,95 the special oath taken before participating in an impeachment
trial, the oath of impeachment must be either wholly redundant or of great - and
intentional - symbolic value. Accordingly, it is likely that the Framers did wish
to instill solemnity within the proceedings.
Even conceding that it is desirable for participants in presidential im-
peachments to recognize the gravity of their actions, there are several problems
90 Id. at 304.
91 See Senate Impeachment Trial of William J. Clinton, Jan. 14, 1999, 1999 WL 12853
(recording Chief Justice Rehnquist's warning that he "would like to inform members of the
Senate and the parties in this case of my need to stand on occasion to stretch my back. I have no
intention that the proceedings should be any way interrupted when I do so.").
92 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
93 See Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Impeachment: Selected
Materials on Procedure 106 (1974) [hereinafter Selected Materials].
94 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993).
95 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.").
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with the idea that the Constitution memorializes a duty to remind the players in
the impeachment drama that they are involved in something important.
First, this perspective fails to recognize the substantive importance of
the Chief Justice's role. As discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision in
Nixon indicated, the duty to preside is an explicit - if ambiguous - constraint on
the power of the Senate.96 The Chief Justice does rule on questions of procedure
and evidence that pertain to the Senate trial.97 If the primary justification for
seating a member of the judiciary on the dais is to instill solemnity in the pro-
ceedings, the Chief Justice - or any official, for that matter - could perform that
function without possessing that sort of procedural authority.
In addition, the Chief Justice's role could conceivably expand beyond
applying the procedural rules that the Senate has already established.98 Consider
the case of a hypothetical Senate impeachment trial in which a majority of the
Senate attempts to institute a flawed procedural mechanism, for example, plac-
ing a burden upon the accused to disprove the existence of an impeachable of-
fense. The accused might rightfully claim that such a scheme violates the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of due process.99 Even if the procedural chicanery does
not rise to the level of a due process violation, the gambit might nevertheless
reflect poorly upon the fairness and the legitimacy of the trial. Few scholars
would assert that, in that case, the Chief Justice should not intervene. A failure
on the part of the Chief Justice to interpose an objection - or, at least, to uphold
the objection of the accused - in those circumstances, independently of the Sen-
ate, could cause him to violate his own oath to uphold the Constitution. °0
That the Senate could become infected with partisanship was well
within the contemplation of the Framers. Indeed, it was a driving force in the
campaign to place impeachment trials within the jurisdiction of the judiciary.101
Although it is true that the Convention ultimately approved a system different
from the Virginia Plan, the somewhat cryptic choice of the Committee of Eleven
to replace judicial trials with a Senate trial over which the Chief Justice would
preside offers some circumstantial support for the proposition that the Chief
Justice is not intended to provide the Senate a high priest who enforces solemn
traditions.
96 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230.
97 See Selected Materials, supra note 93, at 108-09.
98 See John 0. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 650, 652 (1999) ("And in the case of presidential impeachment, they even required the
Nation's highest judicial officer--the Chief Justice of the United States--to preside over the trial
to check any partisan procedural devices.").
99 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law"); see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952)
(recognizing the possibility of a property interest in public employment that falls within the
protections of the Due Process Clause).
100 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
101 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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Second, the idea of the Chief Justice as a symbolic official is inconsis-
tent with conventional understandings of the Constitution's purpose. In contrast
to the Declaration of Independence, with its broad assertions of liberty, the Con-
stitution is, and has long been recognized as, "an inherently practical docu-
ment."'10 2 The Framers did not evince a concern for appearances when they
drafted sensitive constitutional provisions, such as the Refugee Slave Clause.'0 3
It is improbable that, in this instance, the Framers chose to bow to the power of
symbols and install a figurehead over presidential impeachment trials.
The requirements of an oath, as generally applicable to public officials
and specifically applicable to Senators participating in impeachment trials,
might seem to be a concession to symbolism when viewed through a contempo-
rary lens. However, there is strong evidence that the Framers viewed oaths as
tangible sources of obligation, not hortatory gestures.'°4
Furthermore, that the Framers delegated to the Chief Justice an author-
ity that intermingled with that of a coordinate branch casts further doubt that the
Framers intended for the Chief Justice's role to be illustrative or inspirational.
The Framers, to use a modern clichd, took separation of powers very seriously.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist commented on this solicitude for functional
separation in his own account of the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson:
One need only note the way in which the framers arranged the
text of the United States Constitution to realize that they were
concerned about the separation of powers within the new fed-
eral government which they were creating. Each of the three
powers of government - legislative, executive, and judicial - is
dealt with in a separate article. Article I grants legislative power
to Congress, Article II grants the executive power to the Presi-
dent, and Article III vests the judicial power in the Federal
Courts. 105
Chief Justice Rehnquist's focus on the textual structure of the Constitu-
tion is illuminating. The Constitution establishes important components of the
balance among coordinate branches by listing responsibilities beyond the con-
fines of a particular branch's article. The presidential veto power,' 6 the Senate's
responsibilities with regard to federal appointments, 10 7 the Senate's responsibili-
102 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 752 (1999).
103 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
104 See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
(2000).
105 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 9 (1992).
106 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
107 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ties with regard to treaty promulgation,' and the impeachment procedure itself
involve responsibilities that transcend the textual allocation of power into the
article associated with a particular branch.
The Framers' decision to include the Chief Justice's role in presidential
impeachments in this select class of "cross-article" delegations evinces some-
thing qualitatively different than the hope that the Chief Justice would maintain
solemnity when the Senate attempts to remove the President. The Constitution
does not mingle the responsibilities of the branches for such pedestrian aims.
Instead, the Framers resorted to cross-listing institutional responsibilities only
when enumeration could not suffice to constrain the power of a coordinate
branch. In other words, the Chief Justice's duty to preside falls into a narrow
structural category of constitutional directives: those that appear when to permit
one branch to define and exert its own authority would upset the balance in the
national government as a whole.
That the Framers recognized impeachment to be a sui generis sort of in-
ter-branch phenomenon is clear throughout the Constitution's organization. In
addition to vesting power over executive (Article II) and judicial (Article III)
officials in Article I, the Constitution also prohibits the executive (Article II)
from issuing a pardon to the subject of an impeachment, and specifies that the
impeached official shall be liable to other judicial (Article IIM) remedies after the
impeachment is consummated. In light of this elegant and purposive regime, it
would be, at least, out of character for the Framers to grant the Chief Justice a
symbolic place within the text of Article I. The idea is particularly striking when
one considers that the Framers did not include what has come to be the Chief
Justice's most visible symbolic role in American political life, administering the
Oath of Office at the President's inauguration.l°9
The Framers also recognized the primary danger of impeachment to be
aggrandizement by the legislative branch. l l Hamilton's defense of vesting the
Senate with the power to try impeachments did not purport to eliminate the
problems associated with factionalism.I' As Rehnquist observes, "[t]he Framers
were particularly concerned about the possibility of overreaching and bullying
by the legislative branch - Congress - against the other branches."'1 12 The Con-
vention selected the Senate as the forum for impeachment trials because its
delegates considered the absence of political accountability among judges to be
a greater evil than partisan passions where removing the President is concerned.
The appointment of the Chief Justice to the Senate as presiding officer during
presidential impeachment trials was, against this context, a manner to alleviate
108 See id.
109 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (establishing text of Oath, but with no mention of the
Chief Justice).
110 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 51, at 424.
I See id.
112 REHNQUIST, supra note 105, at 9.
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the danger of a congressional putsch while retaining the legitimacy associated
with placing the ultimate decision to convict a President in legislative hands.
In sum, something hollow lies at the center of the idea that the Chief
Justice's role in the presidential impeachment process is merely symbolic. The
delegation to the Chief Justice of actual procedural authority, and the possibility
of independent constitutional power to review Senate impeachment rules, grant
too much control of the trial's conduct to be consistent with the modest goal of
encouraging solemnity during the trial. More importantly, the decision by the
Framers to grant the Chief Justice what is essentially an Article I power suggests
that they perceived the Chief Justice's responsibility to be important for the bal-
ance of relative strengths among the branches of the national government.
B. The Minimalist Notion of the Chief Justice As the Vice President's
Substitute
Another, more popular, conception of the Chief Justice's role in the im-
peachment process posits that the Framers intended the Chief Justice to prevent
the Vice President from sitting over a trial that could "vault him into the presi-
dency."1 3 According to this view, the Chief Justice's role is not substantive, but
completely procedural. The jurist stands at the Senate rostrum for one reason: to
avoid the actual or apparent conflict of interests that would result if the Vice
President presided over the President's trial.
This idea has many prominent proponents, and the fact that many of the
more illustrious members of the legal academy embrace it is reason to give a
critic pause. The strident tone in which some proponents have defended this
view is similarly daunting. Consider the arguments of Chief Judge Richard A.
Posner:
The function of the Chief Justice is to preside as the chairman
of a meeting governed by Robert's Rules of Order presides; that
is, to keep order. He is to rule on objections to evidence and
other matters relating to the conduct of the trial, subject (as un-
der Robert's Rules) to appeal to the Senate; he is not to rule on
issues going to the validity of the proceeding, such as whether
the impeachment was lawful. The Constitution assigns the
Chief Justice to preside over trials of Presidents not because
he's a judge but because the Vice President, who presides over
all other impeachment trials even though he is not required to
be a lawyer, let alone a judge, would have a conflict of interest
in presiding over the trial of the President.
If the limitation of the Chief Justice's authority in impeachment
trials isn't clear as a matter of law (I think it is clear), it is clear
11 Amar, supra note 50, at 297.
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as a matter of political theory. It would undermine the judiciary
to put a single judge, even one as exalted as the Chief Justice of
the United States, in the position of having to determine
whether the President shall be tried by the Senate and possibly
convicted and removed from office, or let off without a trial.
That is one reason impeachments are not tried before the Su-
preme Court or convictions in impeachment trials reviewed by
the courts.
1 4
Similarly, Professor Amar declares that "[tihe idea here was to have a
presiding officer utterly free from even the appearance of conflict of interest." ' 5
He further observes that "[tihis mandatory recusal rule made even more sense at
the Founding, when Presidents did not hand-pick their Vice Presidents, who
were more likely to be rivals than partners.""
6
With respect to Chief Judge Posner, Professor Amar, and other notable
scholars who advance similar justifications for the Chief Justice's participation,
their arguments are internally inconsistent and reflect contemporary ideas about
impeachment in which the Framers almost certainly did not share.
First, the argument falters according to its own terms. If the role of the
presiding officer is nothing more than that of a chairman, then conflict of inter-
est is of no concern. That is to say, the danger that a Vice President - or any
federal official - would abuse his or her position as presiding official is propor-
tional to the authority that the presiding official possesses. If, as Chief Judge
Posner asserts, the Chief Justice possesses only "limited authority," then the
Chief Justice's propensity for abuse of that authority is just as limited. It is be-
yond dispute that the Senate could, as a standing rule or as a matter of appeal,
review every decision of the Chief Justice rendered in fulfillment of his duty to
preside. As such, the Chief Justice probably could not usurp the Senate's control
over the result of impeachment, even if his jurisdiction extended to resolution of
the most important substantive questions.
Chief Judge Posner might respond that the appearance of conflict, rather
than actual conflict, was the evil that the Framers sought to address. However,
this justification explains too little. There are several public officials who could
have prevented the appearance of conflict with greater effect than the Chief Jus-
tice, who, as Sherman noted, may have attained his post through presidential
appointment." 17 The President Pro Tempore of the Senate, for example, owes no
formal allegiance to the President under the Constitution. If preventing the ap-
pearance of conflict is the mark of a virtuous presiding officer in a presidential
impeachment trial, the President Pro Tempore possesses that trait, and possibly
114 POSNER, supra note 2, at 130 (internal footnotes omitted).
115 Amar, supra note 50, at 297.
116 Id. at 312.
117 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
476 [Vol. 104
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss3/4
REHNQUIST'S RENUNCIATION?
a comprehensive knowledge of parliamentary procedure as well. 1,8 It is odd to
suggest, as does Chief Judge Posner, that the Chief Justice, the Vice President,
and other federal officials were interchangeable for purposes of impeachment
trials, but for their relation (perceived or actual) to the President.
As the history of the Impeachment Clauses reveals, the Framers were
well aware of the costs and benefits of involving judicial officers in impeach-
ment trials. Madison's fierce advocacy of judicial impeachment trials and Ham-
ilton's proposal that impeachment trials be conducted by a mixture of judicial
and legislative officials demonstrate that the Framers knew that the Chief Justice
is a different type of official than the Vice President. In essence, Chief Judge
Posner offers an explanation for why the Senate would reject the Vice President
as presiding officer, but he does not account for their choice of a judicial officer
to fill the breach left by the appearance of conflict.
Second, Chief Judge Posner seems to ignore other constitutional puzzles
that spring from the idea that the Chief Justice's role is primarily the prevention
of a conflict. Among them: that the Vice President faces no constitutional dis-
ability from presiding over his own impeachment trial, a conflict more visible
and severe than that caused by a relation between the Vice President and the
President;" 19 that the Framers established a system by which subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution of an impeached President would likely reach the Supreme
Court on appeal, 120 prompting the Chief Justice to decide questions with which
he became familiar as presiding official at the impeachment trial; and that no
constitutional disability prevents the Vice President from presiding over the
impeachment trial of a member of the President's cabinet, with whom the Vice
President would cooperate or compete in the formation of executive policy. As a
matter of theory, political or otherwise, the conflict of interest justification has
too many shortcomings to provide an exclusive explanation for the Framers'
decisions. Chief Judge Posner's arguments are quite unequivocal in offering that
theory as the only reason for the Chief Justice's presence at a Senate trial.
11 Of course, the President Pro Tempore is third in the current line of succession to the
Presidency, after the Vice President and the Speaker of the House, but this arrangement post-
dates the decisions about impeachment procedures at the Convention. In 1792, Congress deter-
mined that the President Pro Tempore would be third in line of succession, but that statute was
amended in 1886 to replace all congressional representatives with cabinet officials. The Presi-
dential Succession Act of 1947 returned the President Pro Tempore to his place in the line of
succession. See generally RUTH CARIDAD SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (2d ed. 1968). In
any case, in order for the President Pro Tempore to exploit his or her role in the impeachment
proceedings, he or she would require the cooperation of the Vice President and the House
Speaker, a significant check on unilateral misconduct intended to vault the President Pro Tem-
pore into the White House.
119 See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment
Trial?: A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 849 (2000); Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 245 (1997); Stephen L.
Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity De-
cision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1357 & n.72 (1983).
120 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Third, if the Framers' initial intent was simply to prevent an actual or
perceived conflict of interest in impeachment trials, they became aware, in short
order, that their efforts had failed. Shortly after the Constitution's ratification,
Alexander Hamilton criticized insider-trading by powerful colonists in The Fed-
eralist, and Hamilton later supported Thomas Jefferson's campaign for Presi-
dent.12 1 Aaron Burr later killed Hamilton in a duel, and Burr, as Vice President,
presided over the impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase.122 Chase was one
of the colonists criticized by Hamilton in The Federalist, and he became, oddly
enough, the first justice to praise the wisdom of the Federalist Papers in the U.S.
Reports. 123 These sorts of personal conflicts may have been inherent conse-
quences of the centralized, aristocratic government that existed at the inception
of the Republic. Dissatisfaction with the Senate as a repository for impeachment
decisions was indeed widespread during the years immediately succeeding the
Convention. By 1798, no greater a populist than Thomas Jefferson could ob-
serve, in a letter to Madison:
I see nothing in the mode of proceeding by impeachment but
the most formidable weapon for the purposes of a dominant fac-
tion that ever was contrived .... I know of no solid purpose of
punishment which the courts of law are not equal to, and history
shows, that in England, impeachment has been an engine more
of passion than justice. 124
The two presidential impeachments suggest that Chief Justices may be
recurrent actors in political dramas that result in impeachment. Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase, for example, was a vociferous enemy of Andrew Johnson's
conciliatory stance toward the defeated Confederacy. Chase attempted unsuc-
cessfully to convince President Andrew Johnson (and a majority of the Supreme
Court) that the Thirteenth Amendment incorporated the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and Bill of Rights against national and state officials as well as private
persons. 25 Chase's biographer recounts that the impeachment of Andrew John-
son was motivated by Chase's desire to eject Johnson from the Presidency and
to prevent General Ulysses S. Grant from attaining that office, so that Chase
himself could pursue the Presidency during the next election. 126 As Professor
121 See David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist,
and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 781-82 (2001).
122 See REHNQUIST, supra note 105, at 18-20.
123 See McGowan, supra note 121, at 782.
124 8 THE WORKS OF JEFFERSON 369-70 (Paul L. Ford, ed. 1905).
125 See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 136 (Kermit L. Hall, ed. 1992).
126 JACOB WILLIAM SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON P. CHASE, U.S.
SENATOR AND GOVERNOR OF OHIO 548 (1874) ("'The impeachment programme had ... two
motives; the first and most important was, of course, to get Andrew Johnson out of the presi-
dency, and the second and hardly less important was, to keep General Grant from getting in.").
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Amar, a proponent of the conflict of interest explanation of the Chief Justice's
role observes, "Chase's critics suspected that his trial conduct was politically
motivated, and that he was using the spotlight to promote his own presidential
candidacy in the upcoming 1868 election."' 127 The presence of Chase at the ros-
trum precipitated a result that is diametrically opposed to what Chief Judge Pos-
ner claims the Framers' to have intended. Even as measured by this limited
sample, either he is incorrect about the Framers' design or the Framers miscal-
culated horribly.
Chief Justice Rehnquist is also susceptible to accusations of conflict, al-
beit to a lesser degree. Professor Amar recalls that "[i]t was [Chief Justice
Rehnquist], after all, who hand-picked the judges of the special division, which,
in turn, hand-picked independent counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate President
Clinton."' 28 However, Professor Amar concludes that the Chief Justice, not the
conflict of interest explanation of the Chief Justice's role, is wrong: "This cozi-
ness between judge and prosecutor is uncomfortably close to the kind of appear-
ance of impropriety that the Framers meant to avoid when they displaced the
Vice President from the chair."'
129
Again, the ascension of the Chief Justice to the rostrum failed to prevent
the appearance of a conflict. In the two opportunities where the Chief Justice's
proffered raison d'pr, sider - preventing conflict of interest - were implicated,
the substitution of the Chief Justice for the Vice President failed to assuage par-
tisan fears. Either the Framers, who were so prescient about so many aspects of
political theory, were wrong, or the explanation is misconceived. It warrants
note that proponents of the conflict theory rarely cite any persuasive authority in
support of their view.
Fourth, the circumstantial evidence described in the preceding subsec-
tion applies with equal force to these arguments that the Chief Justice's role is
constitutionally limited to inconsequential matters. When one considers the
countervailing arguments in the aggregate, the minimalist conceptions of the
Chief Justice's responsibilities inadequately explain why the Framers permitted
the Chief Justice to intrude in Article I, in the circumstances in which the deni-
zens of Article I seek to topple the embodiment of Article H executive power.
An alternative explanation, one that accords the Constitution recognition as a
practical, purposive document, is in order.
IV. THE DUTY TO PRESIDE RECONCEIVED: AN AMBITIOUS PROPOSAL
This section attempts to define the contours of a new perception of the
Chief Justice's power. Like other theories about the meaning of the Impeach-
ment Clauses, the theory is bound to be incomplete and, in some aspects,
127 Amar, supra note 50, at 312.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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flawed. Moreover, this discussion can only establish an aspirational ideal. Just
as the Supreme Court will not review the procedures established by the Senate
for the conduct of impeachment trials, it is extremely unlikely that the Court
would ever subject the Chief Justice to scrutiny for allegedly failing to properly
preside over a Senate trial. To the extent that this section engages in an imagina-
tive reconstruction of the Framers' goals, the resulting theory may be justified
by the benefits that it may generate for the constitutional system.
The Chief Justice should be an independent, active participant in im-
peachment trials. The Framers selected the Chief Justice as presiding officer
because they were aware that adopting judicial participation in the impeachment
trial would have three effects. First, the Chief Justice could infuse parliamentary
decisions with legal reasoning in a manner that would facilitate informed deci-
sion-making on the part of the assembled Senators. Second, the Chief Justice
could serve as an institutional check on partisan overreaching by prompting
Senators to affirmatively adopt or reject controversial or questionable decisions.
Third, the Chief Justice's political involvement in real or imagined conflicts
would inevitably create some dissension about his participation in the impeach-
ment trial. It is likely that the Framers reviewed these three consequences of the
Chief Justice's participation and determined that, on balance, granting the Chief
Justice a role in impeachment trials would provide more benefit than harm.
First, the Chief Justice is an official uniquely suited to offer opinions on
the legal and procedural ramifications of the senators' decisions during the im-
peachment trial. In this regard, this dynamic view of the Chief Justice's role
shares the desire of the minimalist, symbolic role for solemnity and recognition
that the impeachment trial seek the ends of "impartial justice" to the degree pos-
sible within the political environment of the Senate. 30 However, the dynamic
conception asserts that the Chief Justice bears an independent responsibility to
inform and guide the Senate in crafting resolution of questions that arise during
presidential impeachment trials.
This duty to inform is not a severe burden. The Chief Justice, presuma-
bly a person skilled in legal reasoning and familiar with legal precedent, should
offer an independent opinion in response to any parliamentary inquiry. That is,
at any time that a dispute arises between the House impeachment managers and
the President's defense, on any matter, substantive or procedural, the Chief Jus-
tice should, based on his legal expertise and sound discretion, propose a resolu-
tion and offer a reasoned explanation for his decision. This undertaking would
in no way impinge upon the prerogative of the Senate to approve or reject the
Chief Justice's decision, but it would frame the issues in a manner that renders
the issues amenable to lay comprehension and facilitates the informed judgment
of the Senate on matters within its jurisdiction.
In other words, the Framers selected the Chief Justice to preside over
presidential impeachment trials because of the Chief Justice's position as a
judge. Were the Chief Justice unable to bring such a contribution to impeach-
130 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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ment trials - and that is the only contribution that the Framers could have possi-
bly contemplated as issuing from the Chief Justice's involvement - the cost of
injecting the judiciary into the impeachment trial would be excessive. In short,
questions would always linger about the Chief Justice's political predilections
and their effect on his conduct of the Senate trial, but the Chief Justice's contri-
butions as a legal scholar and, presumably, one who has the capability to render
justice decisions, improves the impeachment process in a way that surpasses the
severe costs that involving the judiciary in the provenance of a political branch
inflicts upon the national government. It is difficult to imagine what other quali-
ties the Chief Justice could bring to impeachment proceedings that could sur-
mount the high cost to the reputation of the jurist and to the Supreme Court. As
the preceding discussion indicates, merely attempting to prevent the appearance
of conflict on the part of the Vice President does not foot the bill.
Second, the Chief Justice should actively remind the Senate that they sit
as a body of law, rather than as a channel for partisan interests. In this sense, the
Chief Justice's role is reactive. In contrast to the duty to educate the Senate and
to provide baseline explanations for the Senators to accept or reject, the Chief
Justice should respond to actions that it perceives to be partisan attempts to em-
ploy the impeachment power for improper ends.
The mechanism by which the Chief Justice may prevent abuses is to is-
sue rulings, subject to approval or rejection by the Senate. Collusion among
Senators for the purpose of producing an unjust or unwarranted outcome could
easily result in the conviction of an innocent President or the acquittal of one
sufficiently culpable that his or her removal is warranted. Moreover, the legisla-
tive branch, by its nature, is particularly susceptible to deal making and logroll-
ing. The Chief Justice, with the authority to compel individual Senators to stand
and to vote individually on the propriety of any aspect of the impeachment
process, serves two purposes: promoting the political accountability that Hamil-
ton trumpeted as the primary benefit of vesting in the legislature the authority to
conduct impeachment trials; 31 and appealing to the conscience and reason of
individual senators whenever it appears that a decision of questionable integrity
or fairness could influence the impeachment trial.
This function of the Chief Justice's participation could be characterized
as deliberation-reinforcement. Like the Oath administered to Senators at the
outset of an impeachment trial, the Chief Justice's review would serve as a re-
minder that impeachment is a severe remedy. However, in contrast to the Oath -
or to the symbolic effect of the Chief Justice's presence addressed above - the
Chief Justice's ability to call a vote on any issue would provide a substantive
constraint on the discretion of the Senate. Consider that this sort of participation
in the impeachment trial presents a safeguard of the sort which would sustain
Chief Justice Rehnquist's disposition in Nixon. Indeed, the Chief Justice would,
under this perspective, serve as a conscience of sorts, facilitating deliberation
over procedural questions before the Senate acts. Of course, because the Chief
131 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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Justice's authority would extend only to the ability to force Senators to recon-
sider their actions, the Chief Justice would not usurp the Senate's "sole" power
to try impeachments. Nevertheless, the quality of constitutional decision-making
within the Senate - recently described as a casualty of the Clinton impeachment
saga by a few influential commentators' 32 - would doubtlessly improve.
For an illustration as to how this conception of the Chief Justice's role
differs from that posited by Chief Judge Posner, consider Posner's criticism of
Professor Bruce Ackerman's suggestion that the House or the President may
petition the Chief Justice for a ruling that the impeachment process is invalid.
133
Professor Ackerman asserted that lame-duck impeachments, in which both
houses of Congress are not subject to election during the term that they initiate
and resolve impeachment charges, are constitutionally invalid. 34 In a particu-
larly striking passage, Professor Ackerman pleaded with the House of Represen-
tatives to avoid forcing Chief Justice Rehnquist to decide on the constitutional
validity of lame-duck impeachments. He testified that:
the constitutionality of a lame-duck impeachment will be the
first question confronting Chief Justice Rehnquist, the desig-
nated presiding officer at the Senate trial. Following the prece-
dent established by Chief Justice Chase before and during the
trial of President Andrew Johnson, the Chief Justice will rightly
assert his authority to rule on all procedural issues.
And the first of these should undoubtedly be a motion by the
President's lawyers to quash the lame-duck impeachment as
constitutionally invalid unless reaffirmed by the 106th House.
Now Chief Justice Rehnquist is in fact a scholar on the im-
peachment process, having written an entire book on the sub-
ject. I am sure that he will be fully aware of the historical im-
portance of his conduct of the proceeding, and will quickly
grasp the obvious dangers of lame-duck impeachment ...
Without any hint of partisanship, he would be well within his
rights to quash the lame-duck impeachment and remand the
matter back to the House.
1 35
Because the status of lame-duck impeachments has never before been
132 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the Impeach-
ment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 375 (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 169
(2000).
133 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 129-30.
134 See Testimony of Professor Bruce Ackerman, supra note 23; see also generally BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAME DUCK IMPEACHMENT (2000).
135 See Testimony of Professor Bruce Ackerman, supra note 23.
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briefed and argued in the modem era inaugurated by the Twentieth Amendment,
it is impossible to make a firm guess as to the way the Chief Justice will rule on
the matter. Only one thing is clear. It would be far better for the country and the
Constitution if the Chief Justice is never put to this test.
136
Chief Judge Posner disagrees strenuously with the idea that the Chief
Justice could rule on such a matter of substance, 37 but the more robust concep-
tion of the Chief Justice's impeachment power would welcome such a motion.
If, as Chief Judge Posner indicates, Professor Ackerman's point is with-
out merit, is there a disadvantage to permitting the Chief Justice to so decide?
Chief Justice Rehnquist would declare that lame-duck impeachments are either
constitutionally valid or constitutionally defective and provide reasons for the
decision. The Senate would then review the Chief Justice's decision and his
reasons for that decision, and it would approve or reject the Chief Justice's opin-
ion. Ultimately, the only difference between this outcome and the outcome that
Chief Judge Posner seeks is that the Chief Justice's participation would prompt
more deliberation, provide more information to the Senate and grant the Sena-
tors a baseline to guide their vote.
How did Chief Justice William Rehnquist perform against this dynamic
standard? Rehnquist's passive participation in the impeachment trial drew plau-
dits from commentators who agreed with a minimalist conception of his respon-
sibility. Professor Amar, for example, proclaimed before the impeachment trial
that "[h]istory confirms the wisdom of judicial modesty," and he cautioned
Chief Justice Rehnquist against participating too actively in the proceedings.
38
Similarly Professor Bloch gave the Chief Justice "an A+ [recognizing] his re-
sponsibility was fairly limited."'
' 39
Under the dynamic standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist's performance
could be called an unmitigated disaster. As several scholars have observed, the
Chief Justice failed to resolve independently any procedural question pertaining
to the Senate trial.14° While Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase faced parliamentary
rejection of several of his rulings on procedural or evidentiary matters,
Rehnquist did not provide any rulings to provoke a Senate reaction. Indeed, the
Senate transcript is rife with unfortunate references in which the Chief Justice
unabashedly describes his abject reliance on the Senate Parliamentarian for
guidance in resolving procedural questions.142 The result turns the dynamic con-
136 Id.
137 POSNER, supra note 2, at 130.
138 Amar, supra note 50, at 312.
139 Bloch, supra note 2, at 159.
140 See Charles Tiefer, The Senate Impeachment Trial, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 407, 417 n.59
(2000).
141 See BERGER, supra note 5, at 268-69.
142 See e.g., Senate Impeachment Trial of President Clinton, Feb. 9, 1999, 1999 WL 57254
(REHNQUIST: "The parliamentarian tells me this is all out of order. / (LAUGHTER) / LOT':
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ception on its head: rather than deferring to the will of the Senate after inform-
ing and guiding the senators, the Chief Justice repeatedly deferred to the instruc-
tion of an unelected official, with the substance of Senate rules, rather than their
fairness or propriety, serving as the focus of his inquiry. Chief Justice Rehnquist
was a passive participant in the impeachment trial of President Clinton, and it is
unlikely that his performance fulfilled the constitutional duty to preside over
impeachment trials.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although this Article addresses a momentous question - the participa-
tion of the judiciary in the removal of the President - it is motivated by a modest
ambition. The article seeks to prompt a debate within the legal academy on the
proper role of the Chief Justice in presidential impeachment trials and to prompt
an inquiry among scholars and public officials about whether Chief Justices
have comported with that role.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was a passive participant in the impeachment
trial of President Clinton. He did not provide an independent ruling on any pro-
cedural question. He did not involve himself in the Senate's deliberations. When
the leaders of the parties in the Senate decided that the President's trial would
not feature witnesses, the Chief Justice assented without discussion. In sum, the
Chief Justice did not attempt to ensure the fairness or integrity of the impeach-
ment trial, and while he may receive praise from some quarters of the legal
academy for his performance, Chief Justice Rehnquist' s conduct fell short of the
ideal that the Framers may have envisioned for his post.
If, as this Article posits, the Chief Justice's duty to preside over presi-
dential impeachment trials is an integral aspect of the balance between the
branches of the federal government, Chief Justice Rehnquist' s performance pro-
vides an unfortunate precedent. In subsequent impeachment trials, future Chief
Justices may be reluctant to shape the proceedings, even in the face of unfair-
ness or confusion on the part of the Senate, as a result of the shadow cast by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's conduct in President Clinton's impeachment trial.
Inactivity is almost always more politically palatable than activism, particularly
when the actor is an unelected official in a democratic government.
However, presidential impeachment is an extraordinary event, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's impact on history is likely to be slight. If more than a
century passes between the impeachment trial of President Clinton and the next
presidential trial, it is possible that the legal academy and the Supreme Court
will have recognized the virtue of a judicial influence in the impeachment pro-
ceedings. And a future Chief Justice will assert himself or herself into the politi-
cally daunting maelstrom of impeachment questions, improving the quality of
the discourse therein and, perhaps, returning to a forgotten design of the Consti-
tution' s Framers.
Mr. Chief Justice... / (LAUGHTER)").
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